Evalúe su BATNA usando un proceso de cuatro pasos

[pic 1][pic 2][pic 3][pic 4][pic 5][pic 6][pic 7][pic 8][pic 9][pic 10][pic 11][pic 12][pic 13][pic 14][pic 15][pic 16][pic 17][pic 18][pic 19][pic 20][pic 21][pic 22][pic 23][pic 24][pic 25][pic 26][pic 27][pic 28][pic 29][pic 30][pic 31][pic 32][pic 33][pic 34]

MANAGEMENT REPOR T

BATNA Basics: Boost Your Power at the Bargaining Table

www.pon.harvard.edu

Negotiation Management Report #10

$50 (US)

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Negotiation Editorial Board

Board members are leading negotiation faculty, researchers, and consultants affiliated with the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.

Max H. Bazerman

Harvard Business School

Iris Bohnet

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Robert C. Bordone

Harvard Law School

John S. Hammond

John S. Hammond & Associates

Deborah M. Kolb

Simmons School of Management

David Lax

Lax Sebenius, LLC

Robert Mnookin

Harvard Law School

Bruce Patton

Vantage Partners, LLC

Jeswald Salacuse

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

James Sebenius

Harvard Business School

Guhan Subramanian Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School

Lawrence Susskind

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Michael Wheeler

Harvard Business School

Negotiation Editorial Staff

Academic Editor

Guhan Subramanian

Joseph Flom Professor of Law and Business, Harvard Law School

Douglas Weaver Professor of Business Law, Harvard Business School

Editor

Katherine Shonk

Art Director

Heather Derocher

Published by

Program on Negotiation Harvard Law School

Managing Director

Susan Hackley

Assistant Director

James Kerwin

About Negotiation

The articles in this Special Report were previously published in Negotiation, a monthly newsletter for leaders and business professionals in every field.

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1. Evalúe su BATNA usando un proceso de cuatro pasos.[pic 44]

Adapted from “Accept or Reject? Sometimes the Hardest Part of Negotiation Is Knowing When to Walk Away,” by Deepak Malhotra (professor, Harvard Business School), first published in the Negotiation

newsletter, August 2004.

Era un caso clásico de una asociación empresarial que salió mal. Después de construir una empresa de construcción lucrativa juntos durante varias décadas, Larry Stevenson y Jim Shapiro reconocieron que sus diferencias se habían vuelto irreconciliables. Steven, hijo quería comprar a Shapiro, que estaba dispuesto a vender por el precio correcto. Después de meses de regateo y maniobralegal, Stevenson hizo su oferta final: $8.5 millones para las acciones de Shapiro en la compañía. La compañía vale unos 20 millones de dólares, pensó Shapiro para sí mismo. Poseo el 49% de las acciones. Diablos, ayudé a construir esta compañía. No voy a aceptar nada menos que mi parte justa: 10 millones de dólares. Prefiero pelear en la corte que aceptar $8.5 millones. Shapiro rechazó la oferta, y cada parte se preparó para un juicio. La justificación de Shapiro para rechazar la oferta de Stevenson parecía bastante razonable. Además, los abogados de Shapiro le aseguraron que un fallo judicial muy probablemente estaría a su favor.

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