The ousting of Suharto in 1998

The ousting of Suharto in 1998 saw the emergence of fundamentalist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Jihad and FPI. The rise of these radicalist groups, particularly those with militant tendencies, have tainted Indonesia’s image of democracy and tolerance, especially in Australia. The Australian media suggests that the emergence of extremist groups in Indonesia indicates a change in character of Islam in Indonesia. Fealy argues that there has been a shift in the character of the extremist Islam (which is only followed by a small minority). Nonetheless, the character of the Islam followed by the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims explicitly rejects ideas sustained by extremists.

Despite the government’s quelling of terrorist groups and activies and the majority of Indonesia’s strong stance against extremism, Australians, and even some scholars, still question the character of Islam in Indonesia. In fact, a recent DFAT Newspoll reveals that only 28% of Australians were of the belief that “law making in Indonesia is not based on Islamic codes”. Indeed, the Australian media is responsible for painting a negative image of Islam and Indonesia.The activity of extremist groups since 1998 does not signal a change in the character of Indonesian Islam as a whole but only of a small minority.

Indonesia boasts the largest Muslim population in the world, over 200 million subscribe to Islam. For this reason, it is important to make a distinction between the different Muslim groups and ideologies in Indonesia.Scholars, like Geertz, have drawn a distinction between the devout and less pious Muslims. They choose to use terms the “santri” and “abangan” to distinguish them. Santri refers to more devout and modernist Muslims, who place greater significance on the Qu’ran and Islamic identity. The abangan refers to more traditional muslims who mix their Islam with traditional Javanese beliefs. It is widely accepted that the proportion of santri Muslims has increased since the late 1970’s, this process known as “santri-isation”.(ISLAM AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY). The number of Muslims praying at mosques, wearing headdresses and taking pilgrimage to Mecca has grown whilst the number of abangan has rapidly fallen. This gives the impression that Indonesian Islam is becoming more radical, leading to the formation of extremist groups. However, it is important to note that the process of “santri-isation” started long before 1998 and the rise of the extremist groups. While Fealy also suggests the parts of santri are open to external influence, the majority of Indonesian santri has been for the most part influenced by the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. Contrary to Jemaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad are more influenced by Salafi Jihadist interpretations of Islam. It follows that santri is following an established trajectory, one separate from that of Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Jihad and the FPI. This shows that if there has been a change in the character of santri, it is not linked to the development of extremist groups.

Since the rise of extremist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Islam and the FPI, the character of Indonesian Islam in Indonesia was brought into question.These groups attracted a lot of media attention. However, group numbers and supporters of these groups did not make up a high percentage of the Indonesian population. In the wake of Soeharto’s ousting, Laskar Jihad became the largest of the militant group, boasting 10,000 members in 2001 (evolving terrorirst threat p70. Jemaah Islamiyah is estimated to have at most a few thousand members including those outside Indonesia .Finally, the FPI counted a mere 3000 members. The number of people supporting extremist groups in Indonesia pale in comparison to mainstream groups such as Nahdatul Ulama (counting 25 million members in 2003SOURCE FEALY 153), the largest Indonesian Muslim group. This indicates that the majority of Indonesians do not align themselves with extremist factions.

While the number of people dirrectly supporting extremists groups are not very substantiel, it is not a clear indication of Indonesia’s perception of them.

The landslide victory of the Democratic Party in 2004, led by Yudhoyono, made it clear that Indonesia was dedicated to pledge its support to Yudohoyono’s cause. Yudohno vowed to combat terrorism, fix Indonesia’s battered economy and to introduce harsh laws in order to crack down on Islamic extremism. (Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia 58)

Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Soeharto’s New order Regime, Islam was politically marginalised and subject to state repression. On the 20th of Octobor 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the 4th president of Indonesia. He was the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Politicians believed Abdurrahman’s victory symbolised the revival of Islamic parties. ( DIVIDED MAJORITY FEALY)

In recent times, Islamist parties have seen an increase in support. The success of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) might suggest a potential change in the character of Islam. Hamayotsu argues that the rise and fall of religious parties is determined by party institutionalization. He suggests that the fall of more moderate parties like the PKB(National Awakening Party) can be attributed to poltical clientilism and party fragmentation. Mujani and Liddle argue that the PKS success can be attributed to their public opposition of corruption which also reflects the Islamic pr

The ousting of Suharto in 1998 saw the emergence of fundamentalist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Jihad and FPI. The rise of these radicalist groups, particularly those with militant tendencies, have tainted Indonesia’s image of democracy and tolerance, especially in Australia. The Australian media suggests that the emergence of extremist groups in Indonesia indicates a change in character of Islam in Indonesia. Fealy argues that there has been a shift in the character of the extremist Islam (which is only followed by a small minority). Nonetheless, the character of the Islam followed by the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims explicitly rejects ideas sustained by extremists.

Despite the government’s quelling of terrorist groups and activies and the majority of Indonesia’s strong stance against extremism, Australians, and even some scholars, still question the character of Islam in Indonesia. In fact, a recent DFAT Newspoll reveals that only 28% of Australians were of the belief that “law making in Indonesia is not based on Islamic codes”. Indeed, the Australian media is responsible for painting a negative image of Islam and Indonesia.The activity of extremist groups since 1998 does not signal a change in the character of Indonesian Islam as a whole but only of a small

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